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Introduction 
 
Although it has been practically used throughout the history of logic, the Principle of 
Bivalence got its name and its explicit formulation only in Lukasiewicz’s Rector’s 
Speech in 1922
1
, after he mentioned, for the first time, the “three-valued logic”, 19182, 
and outlined a “trivalent system of logic”, 19203. The reason for such a late recognition 
of one of the basic logical principles lies probably in the fact that, in traditional logic, the 
Principle of Bivalence was derivable from the Principle of Contradiction and the 
Principle of Excluded Middle. Namely, if it holds, for any proposition, that the 
conjunction of it and its negation is always false, whereas the disjunction of it and its 
negation is always true, then, given the standard way in which conjunction, disjunction 
and negation are defined, it follows that every proposition must have one and only one of 
the two truth values – truth or falsity – which is exactly what the Principle of Bivalence 
claims. So, in traditional logic, being either true or false becomes a necessary condition 
for being a proposition. 
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     The appearance of intuitionism, where the axiom that expresses the Principle of 
Excluded Middle ceased to be a theorem
4
, could have caused a re-examination of the 
situation in the way that would consequently lead to an explicit formulation of the 
Principle of Bivalence, but this didn’t happen, probably because, by restricting the 
universal validity of the Principle of Excluded  Middle, nobody questioned the previous 
“triviality” that there are just two truth-values exclusively ascribable to every proposition. 
But it is to be noted that in intuitionistic logic, in spite of the fact that in the case where 
neither p nor p is provable, one is not allowed to claim p  p – since this formula is 
not an instance of a theorem scheme – there supposedly mustn’t be any case in which one 
would be allowed to claim that p  p is false, since this would lead to the denial of the 
Principle of Contradiction. 
     So, curiously enough, a clear separation of the Principle of Bivalence from the other 
two basic principles of traditional logic was made only after the appearance of trivalent 
logic, in which the Principle of Bivalence was rejected. 
     The Principle of Contradiction, the Principle of Bivalence and the Principle of 
Excluded Middle are three independent principles. The Principle of Contradiction holds 
in any system whose interpretation contains just truth and falsehood, independently of 
whether the other two principles hold in it or not. So, the Principle of Contradiction holds 
unrestrictedly in intuitionistic logic, in which the validity of the Principle of Excluded 
Middle is restricted, as well as in the bivalent systems with truth-value gaps. The 
Principle of Bivalence (in its strong sense) holds only in systems in which there are no 
other truth-values but truth and falsity and in which there are no truth-value gaps, so that 
each proposition is necessarily either true or false. 
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     Now, it can be argued that the fact that the Principle of Bivalence was so late 
separated from the other two basic principles of traditional logic is precisely that which 
caused a rather strange confusion present in traditional interpretations of Aristotle’s 
famous Sea Battle example before Lukasiewicz. For, on the one hand, it is Aristotle 
himself who was the first to formulate the general validity of the Principle of 
Contradiction as well as of the Principle of Excluded Middle, while, on the other hand, it 
seems obvious that the Sea Battle example was intended to check some basic principle. 
Which one? It couldn’t be the Principle of Excluded Middle, since Aristotle said 
explicitly that p  p should be considered true in the given example (where p is the 
proposition that the sea battle takes place at a given later time and p its negation). It can 
hardly be the Principle of Contradiction, because, for Aristotle, this principle is the most 
general and absolutely valid principle. So, it can only be the Principle of Bivalence that is 
challenged in the Sea Battle example, but in the absence of its explicit formulation, the 
interpreters were at pain to cope with the problem without a clear guidance. In particular, 
the Christian logicians seemed to be in a much worse situation than the ancient Greek 
philosophers, for, according to Christian theology, God is assumed to know whether it is 
p or it is p that is true already at the time at which, in the example, it is supposed that it 
is not yet decided what the case will be. 
     In the first section of the paper, I shall start with Aristotle’s original formulation of the 
problem and his solution to it. Then, in the second section, I shall show why Boethius’ 
eternalist view concerning a similar problem is irrelevant for Aristotle’ problem and 
analyze Ockham’s solution (or “solution”) as a typical failure of the traditional use of 
modalities to avoid logical determinism without questioning the Principle of Bivalence. 
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At the same time, however, the Aristotelian concept of conditional necessity, which is 
called necessity per accidens in Ockham’s analysis, will be of great importance for the 
solution I am going to offer in the fourth section of the paper. 
     In the third section, Lukasiewicz will be praised as the first logician in the history who 
recognized that Aristotle’s example is directed against the Principle of Bivalence. 
Lukasiewicz’s solution to the problem of logical determinism, given within a trivalent 
system of logic, is simple, intuitive and consistent. 
      The solution that I shall offer in the fourth section is based on the recognition of 
Lukasiewicz’s diagnosis of the source of the problem, and, in a sense, my solution is 
nothing else but a refinement of Lukasiewicz’s solution. The striking difference consists 
in the fact that the Principle of Bivalence will be retained. But this will appear to be 
possible only because the whole background in which this principle should hold will have 
been radically changed. For instance, a modal logic system will be used, along with the 
possible world semantics, but essentially combined with temporal logic, while a 
generalization of Tarski’s disquotational scheme will turn out to be needed for 
overcoming the “indeterminateness”, which is introduced in trivalent logic as the third 
truth-value. 
     Finally, in the fifth section, it will be shown why we need tenses if we want to be able 
to define that which is called the open future. From a metaphysical point of view, this 
means that we need the flow of time assumption if we want to speak of real, in-the-world-
inherent possibilities. Time should be conceived as essentially similar to a line-in-
drawing and not to a drawn line. 
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I. Aristotle’s puzzle and his solution: the acceptance of truth- 
    value gaps  
 
The Sea Battle example concerns future contingent singular propositions. However, in 
order to avoid ambiguities I shall take that instead of being tensed, p and p, as a pair of 
two contingent singular propositions stating and denying respectively that some 
sufficiently well specified event occurs at some definite date are considered at some 
earlier time. So, p will not mean “the sea battle will take place tomorrow”, but “the sea 
battle takes place at t”, while p will be its negation. In this way, the question concerning 
the truth of p and p becomes the question of whether it is true at some time earlier than t 
that it is p that will be true at t or it is rather p that will be true at t. This stipulation will 
do no harm for understanding the problem and its solution suggested by Aristotle. 
     Now, there is an enormous literature concerning the reading of Aristotle’s text, his 
understanding of the problem and its suggested solution.
5
 Instead of analyzing various 
concepts of necessity and possibility and their different meanings allegedly relevant for 
the Sea Battle problem as formulated and solved by Aristotle, which characterizes both 
the medieval and the non-standard modern interpretations,
6
 I myself am prone to 
generalize what William Lane Craig says by discussing one of them: “It seems to me best 
to take Aristotle at face value […] and not introduce further qualifications”. Fortunately, 
there are no uncertainties about the original wording of the most important passages in 
which Aristotle summarizes the problem and offers his solution. So, I shall simply start 
by citing them in full. 
     As for the way in which Aristotle understands indeterminism in the sense relevant for 
the Sea Battle problem, he says: 
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“…not everything is or happens of necessity: some things happen as chance has it, and of the affirmation 
and negation neither is true rather than the other; with other things it is one rather than the other and as a 
rule, but still it is possible for the other to happen instead”.7 
 
     As for problem of truth and falsity concerning the future contingent propositions, he 
says: 
“What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarily is not, when it is not. But not everything 
that is, necessarily is; and not everything that is not, necessarily is not. For to say that everything that is, is 
of necessity, when it is, is not the same as saying unconditionally that it is of necessity. Similarly with what 
is not. And the same account holds for contradictories: everything necessarily is or is not, and will be or 
will not be; but one cannot divide and say that one or the other is necessary. I mean, for example: it is 
necessary for there to be or not to be a sea battle tomorrow; but it is not necessary for a sea battle to take 
place tomorrow, nor for one not to take place – though it is necessary for one to take place or not to take 
place. So, since statements are true according to how the actual things are, it is clear that wherever these are 
such as to allow of contraries as chance has it, the same necessarily holds for the contradictories also. This 
happens with things that are not always so or are not always not so. With these it is necessary that one part 
of the contradiction
8
 is true or false – not, however, this one or that one, but as chance has it; or for one to 
be true rather than the other, yet not already true or false. 
     Clearly, then, it is not necessary that of every affirmation and opposite negation one should be true and 
the other false. For what holds for things that are does not hold for things that are not but may possibly be 
or not be; with these it is as we have said.”9 
      
      It is evident that Aristotle speaks of indeterministic events in the same way in which 
we do it today: “some things happen as chance has it”. He also allows for the possibility 
that some events are more probable than the others (“with other things it is one rather 
than the other and as a rule, but still it is possible for the other to happen instead”). 
However, the difference between the two cases is of no relevance to our problem. We can 
take events that are more probable to happen to be indeterministic as well but 
characterize them as not completely indeterministic, or we can simply ignore them as not 
relevant to the problem. It is sufficient to consider only completely indeterministic events, 
for which it is supposedly by no means determined whether they will happen or not.  
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    What is logical determinism according to Aristotle is clearly discernible in what he 
says in the second quotation. Given the correspondence theory of truth (“statements are 
true according to how the actual things are”), an indeterministic event, such as a future 
sea battle supposedly is, mustn’t also be predetermined by the fact that this or that 
particular (τόδε) of the two parts of the contradiction (ἀντίφασις) about it is true at the 
time at which it is not determined in any other way that the battle will happen or that it 
will not happen: “…it is necessary that one part (θάτερον μόριον) of [the two parts of] 
the contradiction is true or false – not, however, this one or that one (τόδε ἢ τόδε), but 
as chance has it; or for one to be true rather than the other, yet not already true or false 
(οὐ μέντοι ἤδη ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ).”10 [italics and bolds added]). 
     Notice that I translated ἀνάγκη μὲν θάτερον μόριον τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἀληθὲς 
εἶναι ἢ ψεῦδος literary as “it is necessary that one part of [the two parts of] the 
contradiction is true or false” and not as Ackrill did it: “it is necessary for one or the other 
of the contradictories to be true or false”. I did it just in order to make it quite clear what I 
take to be Aristotle’s point, namely, that one of the contradictories must be true or false 
only if we take it as a part of a contradiction and not as a concrete proposition. For it is 
said immediately after this statement that it is neither this nor that part (οὐ…τόδε ἢ 
τόδε) that is true of false, for neither is already (ἤδη) either true or false. The general 
lesson is that “it is not necessary that of every affirmation and opposite negation one 
should be true and the other false.” Here “the affirmation” and “the opposite negation” 
are taken as statements per se and not as parts of a contradiction, for if we take them as 
parts of a contradiction, one must be true and another false.  
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     So, Aristotle’s solution is rather subtle. The fact that (at some time earlier than t) 
neither p nor p is either true of false does not imply that p  p is neither true nor false 
(“everything necessarily is or is not, and will be or will not be”). Obviously, Aristotle 
thinks that the fact that, at t, it is necessary that either p is true and p false or p true 
and p false, implies that p  p is true at any time, and so also at any earlier time, 
independently of the fact that it could have been that at some (earlier) time neither p nor 
p were either true or false. In other words, he holds that in some cases a complex 
proposition can have a definite truth-value even if none of the component propositions 
has it. 
     In view of all that has been said, it seems quite obvious that, in a sense, the standard 
modern interpreters
11
 are right when arguing – and in fact only following Lukasiewicz – 
that what Aristotle was denying in order to avoid any kind of determinism, and logical 
determinism in particular, is the Principle of Bivalence. But, however obvious this may 
be, the way in which Aristotle did it might seem tricky. He did not reject the Principle of 
Bivalence by allowing for the possibility of a third truth-value but by allowing the 
existence of truth-value gaps. And even more curiously, by allowing the existence of 
truth-value gaps, he didn’t restrict the universal validity of the Principle of Excluded 
Middle,
12
 but allowed for the possibility that, at some time, a complex proposition can be 
true in spite of the fact that no component proposition has a truth-value. This is the case, 
according to Aristotle, when there is nothing yet in reality that would make either p or p 
either true or false, while p  p is already true, since it is necessary that, independently 
of which of the two propositions will turn out true, the other one will turn out false. 
Brilliantly, and quasi-paradoxically, Aristotle used here just the Principle of Bivalence to 
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explain why the Principle of Excluded Middle should be said to hold (tertium non datur) 
even at the time at which the validity of the very same principle – the Principle of 
Bivalence – is suspended through the introduction of truth-value gaps! 
     For a neutral reader of Aristotle’s text, it can be questionable whether Aristotle 
himself, by allowing truth-value gaps, thought that he was denying the Principle of 
Bivalence, for what he was denying was not that if a proposition has a truth-value it is 
either truth or falsity. What he was denying is only a strong version of the Principle of 
Bivalence that claims not only that if a proposition has a truth-value it is either truth or 
falsity but also that every proposition must have one and only one of the two truth-values. 
However different from some standard interpretations it may be,
13
 I think that only this 
interpretation of Aristotle’s solution fits his own words. 
     I said in the Introduction that in traditional logic the Principle of Bivalence is 
derivable from the Principle of Contradiction and the Principle of Excluded Middle. In 
view of the analysis of Aristotle’s solution to the Sea Battle problem, we may now say 
that this holds only for its strong version, namely, under the assumption that there are no 
truth-value gaps. For, if there are truth value gaps, it is trivially not true that a proposition 
must be either true or false. 
      Now, Aristotle’s solution is not only very subtle, so as to be even quasi-paradoxical, 
but is also non-standard from a point of view of traditional logic, however this 
formulation may seem bizarre, given that he himself is recognized as the philosopher who 
established traditional logic. But this way or another, traditional logic does not allow the 
existence of truth-values gaps, however obvious it may be that Aristotle used these gaps 
to solve the Sea Battle problem. Aristotle’s solution is non-standard also in view of the 
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fact that, in his solution to the Sea Battle problem, he allowed for the possibility that a 
complex sentence p  p is true even if neither p nor p is either true or false at the time 
when p  p is uttered. In other words, for him, p  p is always true because whenever 
p is true p is false and vice versa, while for his followers p  p is always true because 
it is always true either that p is true and p false or that p is true and p false. 
     All in all, I disagree with any standard modern interpretation
14
 that does not accept all 
of the following five claims: (1) that Aristotle based his solution to the Sea Battle 
problem on the correspondence theory of truth; (2) that the essence of his solution 
consists in the acceptance of the truth-value gaps; (3) that he implicitly restricted the 
Principle of Bivalence to its weak version, but did not assume, even tacitly, a third truth 
value; (4) that he did not restrict the universal validity of the Principle of Excluded 
Middle; (5) that the universal validity of the Principle of Excluded Middle is based on the 
acceptance of the possibility that a complex proposition has a truth-value even if the 
component propositions do not have any truth-value. 
     As for the non-standard modern interpretations, it follows that I think that they are all 
wrong as interpretations of Aristotle’s solution. But also, practically all logicians before 
Lukasiewicz, instead of focusing their attention on the basic logical principles, tried to 
solve the Sea Battle problem by concentrating on the analysis of modalities. The 
“solution” of William Ockham’s, whose interest for the problem was reinforced by the 
alleged fact that God has foreknowledge about the truth or falsity of p and p, can serve 
as a typical example to show that such attempts do not solve the original problem. 
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II. The eternalist and the tenseless view: Boethius and Ockham 
 
Boethius, who is said to be the last Roman among Christians and the greatest Christian 
among Romans, and whose Consolatio philosophiae was for centuries the most 
influential book ever written in Latin, defined eternity as “…the perfect and completely 
simultaneous possession of the endless life” ([Aeternitas igitur est] interminabilis vitae 
tota simul et perfecta possessio…)”15 and used this definition to solve the problem of the 
alleged incompatibility between human freedom and God’s omniscience. This problem 
seems to be essentially similar to Aristotle’s Sea Battle problem. How can God know 
some future contingent whose truth should depend on what some person will do 
according to his or her own free will? According to Boethius, God can do it only because 
He transcends time and sees the whole history in one timeless act of awareness. From 
God’s eternalist perspective, the endless history is completely finished and simultaneous 
(tota simul et perfecta), so that nothing is “earlier than” or “later than” something else. 
And then, given this peculiar kind of God’s knowledge, the question about the alleged 
incompatibility between God’s omniscience and the existence of the free will cannot even 
be raised. 
     The problem with Boethius’ solution is that it is completely irrelevant for Aristotle’s 
question, however the two questions discussed may seem to be similar. Namely, since we 
mustn’t pass from the fact that God knows sub specie aeternitatis the truth of a 
contingent proposition p to the statement that He knows it at some time earlier than the 
time the proposition is about, we still may ask whether we should accept that either it is p 
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or it is p that is true at that earlier time or we should rather say that both p and p are 
neither true nor false at that time. 
     William Ockham didn’t separate the two realms that radically as Boethius had 
suggested. For Ockham, not only that God “knows which part of a contradiction is true 
and which false (Deus scit hanc partem contradictionis esse vera vel illam)”16, which 
could be also understood in accordance with Boethius’ eternalism, but He “knows with 
certainty [regarding] all future contingents (omnia futura contingentia) which part (quae 
pars) of the contradiction will be true (erit vera) and which false…”17 [italics added]. 
This last statement – as well as the whole context – could hardly be understood in the 
way in which the contingents were said to be future just for the sake of referring to them 
from the human point of view. Instead, they should be taken to be future contingents 
because they are statements about the facts that are future facts both for humans and for 
God. So, in the given case, God’s knowledge should be understood as foreknowledge 
(praescientia) in a literal sense of the word. 
     The reason for claiming that Ockham did not just repeat what Boethius meant follows 
also from the fact that Ockham made a great effort to analyze the concepts of 
contingency and necessity, and conditional necessity (necessity per accidens) in 
particular, which concern both contingent and necessary truths as well as different kinds 
of God’s knowledge. For this whole analysis would be simply unnecessary if it were 
supposed from the very beginning that God’s knowledge of the whole history has nothing 
to do with time in which the history is situated. 
     Supposing that Ockham didn’t accept Boethius’ radical solution, he was confronted 
with a problem unsolvable also via the theory of truth-value gaps offered by Aristotle. He 
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was quite aware of this when he started his discussion by admitting that “it is impossible 
to express clearly the way in which God knows future contingents”18, which is, at the 
same time, something that “must be held because of the pronouncements of the Saints, 
who say that God does not know things that are going to be (fienda) in a way different 
from that in which [He knows] things that already are (facta)”.19 [italics added]  
     Let us start with one of Ockham’s examples. Given that a person has been and will be 
doing everything needed for being saved, “God knows (scit) that this person will be 
saved” is true, but it is yet possible that “God will never have known (numquam sciverit) 
that this person will be saved. And so the proposition is immutable and is nevertheless not 
necessary but contingent.”20 [italics added] What Ockham here means is, obviously, that 
it is possible that God will never have known that the person will be saved because His 
knowledge about the salvation depends, inter alia, on everything that the person will do 
by using his or her free will. If he or she has been and will be doing everything needed 
for being saved, God will have foreknowledge that he or she will be saved, and if he or 
she hasn’t been or will not be doing that, He will have foreknowledge that he or she will 
not be saved. Doesn’t this mean that, in addition to what he or she has been doing, that 
which he or she will be doing causes backwardly God’s foreknowledge about his or her 
salvation or non-salvation? 
     It is hard to believe that Ockham used, at least tacitly, the concept of backward 
causation in order to explain God’s foreknowledge about future contingents. He rather 
took that for God all truths are tenseless and only wanted to prevent them from being 
necessary. It seems that he believed that for preventing predestination it is sufficient to 
claim that, and explain why, God’s knowledge about salvation is unnecessary. The point 
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should be that God’s knowledge is contingent just as what the person will do is 
something contingent, depending on his or her free will. 
     Another example of Ockham’s, in which God does not appear, has the same point. If 
‘Sortes sits’ is true at some time, ‘Sortes sat’ “will afterwards always be necessary.”21 But 
“it is not necessary that a necessary [proposition] about the past corresponds to a 
proposition necessarily true about the present.”22 [italics added]  Evidently, this means 
that though, if Sortes is sitting now, it will be necessary, at any later time, that he was 
doing so, it is not true that it was necessary that he would be sitting now, for there was 
nothing in the past that made Sortes’ sitting now necessary. 
     But, however brilliant this Ockham’s analysis of the contingency and the only 
conditional necessity of p as the statement about someone’s salvation as well as God’s 
knowledge about it may be, it doesn’t even touch directly the problem of truth and falsity 
of p or p at some time earlier than the time at which either p or p is supposedly true. 
It still remains the question of whether it is p or it is p that is true at this time or there is 
rather a truth-value gap related to the truth and falsity of p and p.  
     But even worse, since knowledge implies truth (Kp  p), God’s foreknowledge about 
p, quite independently of whether it is necessary or contingent, implies that either p is true 
or p is true at some time earlier than the time at which it is either p or it is p that is 
true, which means that, given the truth of p or the truth of p at some time earlier than 
the time at which it is either p or it is p that is true, it is logically predetermined either 
that a person will be saved or that he or she will not be saved.    
     All in all, by being sufficiently detached from the human perspective, both Boethius’ 
eternalism and Ockham’s tenseless view concerning the truth of all propositions can 
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explain God’s omniscience, but they don’t solve Aristotle’s puzzle. The former simply 
has no answer to Aristotle’s question concerning the truth or falsity of some proposition p 
at some time that is earlier than the time p is about, while the latter cannot even avoid 
logical determinism, because God’s praescientia of p that is implied by His omniscientia 
implies also the truth or falsity of p independently of the question of modality, which 
means that what p is about is predetermined by the fact that either it is p or it is p that is 
true already at some time earlier than the time at which either p is true or p is true. 
 
 
III. Three-valued logic: Lukasiewicz 
 
As already mentioned above, Jan Lukasiewicz was the first philosopher who realized that 
Aristotle’s Sea Battle problem is not something that could be solved by any analysis, 
however subtle, of the concepts of contingency, necessity and conditional necessity, 
because it concerns something much deeper: it represents a challenge for one of the basic 
principles of traditional logic. This principle is the Strong Principle of Bivalence, which 
states that every proposition is either true of false. Aristotle himself was quite aware of 
this and that’s why he, as it is shown above, rejected the Strong Principle of Bivalence 
and accepted instead only its Weak Version, according to which every proposition is true 
or false if it has a truth-value at all. But, according to him, it must be that there are 
propositions that are neither true nor false if logical determinism should be false. And 
since Aristotle took it for granted that logical determinism is false, he admitted the 
existence of truth-value gaps. 
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     Now, Lukasiewicz made just one small additional step, but this step was 
revolutionary: instead of allowing for the existence of truth-value gaps, he introduced a 
third truth-value. He himself compared this change with the introduction of non-
Euclidean systems of geometry
23
, and I think that he was right in having made that 
comparison. As he said in his Rector’s Speech, because “what I call the Principle of 
Bivalence (sic!)” […] “lies at the very foundations of logic, the principle under 
discussion cannot be proved. One can only believe it, and he alone who considers it self-
evident believes it. To me, personally, the principle of bivalence does not appear to be 
self-evident. Therefore I am entitled not to recognize it, and to accept the view that 
besides truth and falsehood there exist other truth-values, including at least one more, the 
third truth value”.24 
     Let us consider a trivalent system of Lukasiewicz’s that deviates least from two-
valued logic
25
 and is, at the same time, sufficient for solving the Sea Battle problem. 
     The two-valued logic we shall start with contains two logical constants, T and , 
which denotes truth and falsehood respectively, = as the identity sign, schematic letters a, 
b, c,… which particular propositions and T and  can be substituted for, and logical 
constants , ,  and . Now, the principles of two-valued logic are: 
1. The principles of the identity of falsehood, identity of truth, and non-identity of 
truth and falsehood: ( = ) = T, (T = T) = T, ( = T) = (T = ) = . 
2. The principles of implication: (  ) = (  T) = (T  T) = T, (T  ) = . 
3. The definitions of negation, disjunction and conjunction: a = (a  ), a  b =  
      = ((a  b)  b), a  b = (a  b). 
The three-valued system contains all the symbols of the above system of two-valued   
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logic but also ½ as a third logical value. The principles specified above concerning  and 
T, and the definitions of negation, disjunction and conjunction remain the same in the 
three-valued system, only that ½ may also be substituted for a and b, in which case the 
additional principles of identity and implication concerning ½ should hold: 
1a. The principles of identity: ( = ½ ) = (½ = ) = (T = ½) = (½ = T) = ½, (½ = ½) =    
      = T. 
2a. The principles of implications: (  ½ ) = (½  T) = (½  ½) = T, (½  ) = 
      = (T  ½) = ½. 
Some laws of three-valued logic differ partly from those of two-valued logic. The 
most important amongst them are the Principle of Contradiction and the Principle of 
Excluded Middle, since though for a = T or a = , a  a equals , for a = ½, a  a 
equals ½ (and not ), whereas though for a = T or a = , a  a equals T, for a = ½,  
a  a equals ½ (and not T), since in this case a = a is true. 
     If we now apply the three-valued system to the Sea Battle problem and interpret the 
third value not as related to what is true or false but to what is “possible”, we can see 
directly where Aristotle and Lukasiewicz agree and where they disagree. They agree at 
the most important point, namely, that neither p nor p (as I defined them above at the 
beginning of Section I) is either true or false before time t they speak about, whereas, at 
the same time, it is either p that is true at t or it is p that is true as t. But while Aristotle 
stopped here, the three-valued system enables Lukasiewicz not only to claim that p and 
p do have truth-values at some time earlier than t but also, which would sound quite 
strange to Aristotle, that p  p is true before t. Namely, by consulting the above 
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principles of identity of truth-values and the definition of conjunction, it can be seen that, 
for p = ½, p = p, and so, p  p is not false. 
     One might say that the two solutions, that of Aristotle’s and that of Lukasiewicz’s, are 
essentially similar, being based on the same intuitions. A possible advantage of 
Lukasiewicz’s solution may be that it is also based on an independently sketched system 
of logic, while Aristotle’s solution might seem ad hoc, since he introduced truth-value 
gaps at this singe place, just in order to avoid logical determinism. This possible 
advantage of Lukasiewicz’s solution, which is an advantage more from a purely logical 
than a metaphysical point of view, will become more visible, when we now turn to the 
implications of the two solutions that concern the Principle of Excluded Middle. 
     Let us remember that, according to Aristotle, though neither p nor p is either true or 
false at some time earlier than t, p  p is true at any time. As already mentioned, this 
claim of Aristotle could seem a bit strange, since in this case the complex proposition has 
a truth value in spite of the fact that the component propositions do not. According to the 
three-valued system, not only that it is not so, but, given that neither p nor p is either 
true or false at some time, p  p is not true at that time, since, as we have seen, if p = ½, 
p  p is not true, because p = p. 
     All in all, if “the indeterministic philosophy […] is the metaphysical substratum of the 
new logic”26, as Lukasiewicz put it, the three-valued system of logic shows its force 
through its natural application to the Sea Battle problem. 
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IV. A solution to the Sea Battle Problem within temporal-modal  
      logic 
 
It might be said that the solution to the Sea Battle problem that I am now going to offer 
relates to that of Lukasiewicz’s in a way rather similar to that in which Lukasiewicz’s 
solution relates to that of Aristotle’s. Namely, I completely agree with Lukasiewicz just 
as he agrees with Aristotle that if we accept that it is universally true that “if A is b at 
instant t, then it is true at every instant earlier than t that A is b at instant t”27, where A 
stands for a contingent proposition and b for one of the only two truth values, logical 
determinism is unavoidable, since either truth or falsity of a contingent future proposition 
at every time earlier than t predetermines what is to happen at t in at least the same (if 
not a stronger) sense in which this is so according to any other type of determinism. But 
just as Lukasiewicz supplemented Aristotle’s solution, which assumes truth-value gaps, 
by introducing “possibility”28 as a third truth-value, so I want to analyze “possibility” a 
bit further. 
      The most important thing to be noticed is that, though the above quotation of 
Lukasiewicz’s implies that if (in accordance with the above notation) Ae(tn) is supposed 
to mean that it is asserted (A) that the sea-battle (e) happens at tn that denotes the time-
interval that is exactly tomorrow in relation to the interval at which Ae(tn) is assereted 
(say tm), the truth of Ae(tn) implies logical determinism, it need not be so in relation to the 
truth of Ae(tn), because Ae(tn) can be understood as stating straightforwardly and only 
that, today (at tm), there is no such thing as a tomorrow’s-sea-battle, without the 
implication that there will be no sea-battle tomorrow. This open space for claiming that 
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there will be a sea-battle tomorrow and there will be not a sea-battle tomorrow are both 
false today, whereas, when tomorrow becomes today, one of the two contradictory 
statements will be true. The Principle of Excluded Middle holds today and will hold 
tomorrow, though for different reasons. Everything depends on whether it is only tm on 
which a world is actualized or there is a world actualized on tn as well. Moreover, once a 
world on tn is actualized — but only then — it becomes possible to say that if Ae(tn) is 
true, it was true on tm that it would be true on tn, because everything that has happened 
actually belongs to one and the same reality.  
     From both metalogical and metaphysical points of view, more is to be said about the 
difference between the reality and the actual and the possible worlds as well as about the 
relation between the real world and the actual and possible worlds. 
     Though I don’t want to claim that there cannot be more real worlds, the whole system 
will be sketched under the assumption that there is just one real world. In any case, the 
modal realism of David Lewis’29 will not be presupposed. Moreover, it will be assumed 
that there is an essential difference between worlds that are actual and those that are 
possible but not actual, where actual worlds will be taken to be time segments of the real 
world, i.e., parts of the real world that have some temporal extension.
30
  
     The axioms defining the structure of time that will be used in what follows are cited in 
the Appendix.
31
 Intuitively, time will be taken to consist of time stretches (intervals or 
periods) which time variables t1, t2,…, tn,… range over, while particular stretches will be 
denoted by constants t1, t2,…, tn,… . Relations in which time intervals can stand are the 
identity relation, the precedence relation, the abutment relation, the overlapping relation 
and the inclusion relation, denoted by , ,   and  respectively. 
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     As for the possible worlds, I shall take, of course, that all actual worlds are possible 
(because actuality implies possibility), whereas merely possible worlds will be taken to 
be worlds that are not actual, be they accessible or not. Accessible possible worlds will be 
taken to be possible worlds that are either already actual or merely possible but also 
actualizable starting from a real world segment (this will be formally defined below). 
Actualizable (but not actual) possible worlds will be worlds that are accessible from a 
real world segment according to the accessibility relation (that will be also formally 
introduced below). 
     From a metalogical point of view, we need to adjust Tarski’s disquotational scheme so 
that it becomes applicable not only to the real world but also to worlds that are possible 
but not actual (i.e., at least not yet real).
32
 Using Tarski’s example that concerns the truth 
of the proposition “snow is white”, we may generalize the disquotational scheme in the 
following way: 
”snow is white” is true in world w, be it actual or possible, if and only if snow is white in 
w. 
 
But though the bi-conditional should hold in any case, we shall take that  
 
if w is a time segment of the real world, ”snow is white” is true because, at the 
corresponding time and in the corresponding actual world as a segment of the real world, 
snow is de facto white, 
 
while, 
 
if w is not actual but possible, snow is white in w because “snow is white” is supposedly 
one of the true propositions from a set of propositions through which w is described. 
 
     More is to be said about the meaning of “a set of propositions through which a 
possible world w is described”. Let us remember our central example and take that Ae(tn) 
is the assertion A that the sea battle e happens at tn, and Ae(tn) its negation. It is clear 
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that we want to say that Ae(tn) is true in any possible world that contains Ae(tn) as one of 
the propositions that describe it consistently, while Ae(tn) is true in any possible world 
that contains Ae(tn) as one of the propositions that describe it consistently. So, we are 
rather interested in the equivalence classes of the worlds in which Ae(tn) and Ae(tn) are 
true respectively than in just two particular worlds in which Ae(tn) and Ae(tn) are true 
respectively. 
     If we consider another pair of assertions, Ae’(tn) and Ae’(tn), and take that Ae’(tn) 
says that it rains at tn and Ae’(tn) that it doesn’t, it is clear that both Ae(tn) and Ae(tn) 
are compatible with each of Ae’(tn) and Ae’(tn). This means that Ae(tn) and Ae(tn) 
divide the whole class of not actual but actualizable worlds into two exclusive 
equivalence subclasses w1 and w2, whereas Ae’(tn) and Ae’(tn) divide it into two 
other exclusive equivalence subclasses w3 and w4. If so, w1, w2, w3 and w4 are 
all not identical among each other, but also none of the four cuts w1 ∩ w3, w1 ∩ w4, 
w2 ∩ w3 and w2 ∩ w4 is empty. If we proceed in this way, by introducing always 
new and new pairs of assertions that divide the class of all the actualizable worlds in a 
new way, that is Ae’’(tn) and Ae’’(tn), Ae’’’(tn) and Ae’’’(tn), …, etc., the number of 
worlds described by a cut of equivalence classes will become smaller and smaller. The 
ideal limit would be reached by such a partition of the class of all the actualizable worlds 
according to which every subset were a singleton. At the end, any singleton, containing 
just one completely individuated possible world would be described by a maximally 
consistent set of contingent propositions, so that the addition of any independent 
contingent proposition that preserves the consistency of the description were not possible 
any longer. 
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     The concept of the maximally consistent set of contingent propositions may seem 
tricky for various reasons. But independently of this, our temporal modal logic is 
temporal logic of events, and I don’t want to extend the concept of event so that every 
contingent proposition is about an event. So, no description obtained through a set of our 
elementary formulae concerning events could ever be the maximally consistent set of 
contingent propositions, since it would always be possible to add consistently some 
contingent proposition that is not about an event but about something else. But actually, 
we don’t need a set of propositions that describes a possible world completely. We 
should only be aware of the fact that whenever we talk about “a world w described by a 
set of propositions” we talk ipso facto about the equivalence class [w] in which the set of 
propositions describing w is true. 
     Yet another thing that should be clarified concerns what I call Prior’s Axiom (due to a 
suggestion he made in Oberwolfach shortly before he died).
33
 We say normally of a green 
board that it is completely green in spite of the fact that, according to the current theory 
of colour, it should not be said to be green if we took it to consist of very tiny regions to 
which the concept of colour were not applicable. We do say that the board is completely 
green because we take greenness to be a holistic property, so that if the board is green, 
every part of it is green. Analogously, I shall take that if Ae(tn) is true, Ae(tm) is also true 
for any tm  included in tn, that is, I shall take that 
     (tn)(Ae(tn)  (tm)(tm tn  Ae(tm))) 
is axiomatically true, and call it Prior’s Axiom. Intuitively, it is correct to say that the 
Second World War lasted uninterruptedly in spite of the fact that, taken per se, the 
concept war is inapplicable in a case in which the time interval is, say, just a billionth 
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part of a second. But, of course, if tn tm, i.e., if it is not tm that is included in tn but 
conversely, tn is included in tm, Ae(tm) can be only contingently true if Ae(tn) is true. 
     After all these preliminaries, let me introduce the central components of the apparatus. 
As for modal logic, we need a standard model for modal logics.
34
 Purely formally, a 
standard model is a structure  
   M = W, R, P, where 
 
(1) W is a set; 
(2) R is a binary relation on W (i.e. R  W  W); 
(3) P is a mapping from natural numbers to subsets of W (i.e. Pn  W, for each natural 
     number n). 
 
     When interpreted quite generally, W is a set of possible worlds, R a relation between 
them and P an assignment of sets of possible worlds to atomic sentences. In our case, (in 
addition to elementary formulae of the time system defined in the Appendix) the 
elementary formula will be Ae(tn) as it is understood above as well as any formula 
obtainable by substituting e’, e’’, e’’’,… for e and/or t1, t2,…, tn,… or t1, t2,…, tm,… for tn. 
If ordered, the atomic sentences will be denoted by p1, p2,…, pn,… . In accordance with 
what is said above about the relation between atomic sentences and the possible worlds 
which they describe and the way in which each atomic sentence is associated with an 
equivalence class of (accessible) possible worlds in which it is true, P, by mapping 
natural numbers to subsets of W, is to be understood as mapping each of p1, p2,…, pn,… to 
exactly those possible worlds in which it is true. 
     The interpretation of the relation R in a standard model can vary significantly.
35
 In 
view of our purposes, it should be understood as the accessibility relation whose domain 
is the set of all the worlds that are actual and whose anti-domain is the set of all the 
possible worlds that are actual and actualizable. This means that in αRβ α is a real world 
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time segment and β either a real world time segment or a possible world that can become 
actual but is either not yet actual or not yet completely actualized at least.  
     It should be noted that, according to the interpretation of R just given, its domain 
changes by the flow of time, because the set of all actual worlds will differ tomorrow, 
when some not yet actual worlds become actualized, from the set of actual worlds today.  
     As for the anti-domain of R, it is clear that it will also change by the flow of time 
because it consists partly of all the actual worlds, but it is less clear which worlds among 
those possible worlds that are not actual are to be treated as actualizable. The first guess 
could be that an actualizable world is any possible (not yet actual) world that is a member 
of an equivalence class of all the worlds described by a consistent set of future 
contingents. However, such a definition may seem odd if we look at a simple example. 
For the sea battle between Athenians and Spartans would hardly be said to be possible to 
happen tomorrow if Athenians and Spartans actually don’t have any ships and arms 
today, any reason for fighting, and so on. The suggested definition allows too much. It 
seems necessary to take into account the state of the actual world today and restrict the set 
of actualizable worlds to those which seem to be really possible.
36
 It seems also necessary 
to take into account natural laws and different levels of reality. For instance, after tossing 
a coin, it seems reasonable to say that there are two possible outcomes concerning how 
the coin will fall down. But, from the point of view of classical physics, it can be said that 
these possibilities are based on our ignorance, while one of the two outcomes is actually 
predetermined.
37
 It can be also said that in some cases what is really possible depends on 
a specific physical theory or on its interpretation. So, for instance, some events from the 
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domain of quantum mechanics are really indeterministic according to the mainstream 
interpretation but not according to some others.  
     Yet, however strange this may be, I shall follow the first guess and endorse, in this 
paper, the broadest possible definition of actualizable worlds. For, however unlikely it 
may be that, in the given example, the sea battle between Athenians and Spartans will 
happen tomorrow, it is still logically possible that it happens. We can easily imagine that, 
during the night, God supplies both parties with ships and arms and inspires them to fight. 
The broadest possible definition will be useful for our purposes (however useless it may 
be for analyzing ordinary cases and cases we come across in sciences), and then, once the 
main logico-metaphysical lesson has been learnt, one can restrict the anti-domain of the 
accessibility relation at will. 
     Now, since in accordance with the intended interpretation we want to speak of truths 
in actual and possible worlds that are accessible from a real world segment, W in 
M = W, R, P will consist of an infinite number of actual worlds, where some possible 
worlds are supposed to be accessible from some actual worlds but not from others. So, we 
need a temporal (not tense!) operator that can be prefixed to any given formula — let us 
denote it by {tm} (where another subscript specifying some other real world segment may 
be substituted for m) — which would tell us at which world the given formula is said to 
be true. 
     For any formula F, {tm}F states that 
     at the world actual at tm, ⊨F (F is true).  
If there were no world actualized at tm, F would not be assertable. We may write this as 
{tm}F and stipulate it to mean: 
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     not at a world actual at tm, ⊨F.  
It is important to note that {tm} does not commute with negation, since {tm} F means: 
     at the world actual at tm, not ⊨F.  
So, if there is no actual world at tm, {tm}F is false even if F is a logical truth, of course 
not because F itself is false but because there is no world at tm at which it would hold. 
     The last fact renders possible to state exactly that which we need in the case of the 
tomorrow’s sea battle. Given that Ae(tn) asserts (A) that the sea battle (e) happens at tn, 
then, if tn is tomorrow, both {tn}Ae(tn) and {tm}Ae(tn) are false, because both Ae(tn) and 
Ae(tn) are not assertable at tn. And if we allow the iteration of temporal operators — 
what we of course should do — and if tm denotes today, it becomes possible to say that 
{tm}{tn}Ae(tn) and {tm}{tn}Ae(tn) are both false. At the actual world at tm (today) it is 
both false that the sea battle will as well as that it will not happen at tn (tomorrow). But, at 
the same time, {tm}Ae(tn) is true, because, today, there is no such a thing in the real 
world as the sea battle at tn.            
     In any standard model M = W, R, Pat some world α, the necessity and the 
possibility of a proposition A in view of all the accessible worlds β, denoted by□A and 
◊A respectively, are defined via the truth of A in the worlds  accessible by R from α: 
⊨ □A iff for every  such that R, ⊨A, 
     ⊨ ◊A iff for some  such that R, ⊨A. 
Since the truth of □A and ◊A depends on α, which may be actual, actualizable or non-
actualizable, for any A, □A and ◊A are not closed (just as f(x) in the predicate calculus) 
before being prefixed by a temporal operator. 
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     Now, given that we have assumed that there is just one real world, then, according to 
the concept of conditional necessity, which the medieval logicians called necessity per 
accidens and which we may, in the given context, rather call inaccessibility per 
accidens,
38
 the fact that some world β is actual at tn precludes the possibility that some 
other world, different from β, is actual at tn. This means that 
     (tn)(tm  tn  tm tn  ({tm}Ae(tn)  {tm}□Ae(tn))) 
for, in any such case, Ae(tn) is a proposition about a world that is already actualized. 
Notice that if there is no world that is actual at tm, the formula is trivially true because the 
second antecedent is false. 
     If tm  tn, the modality of Ae(tn) depends on whether the world at tn is actual, partly 
actualized, or accessible but not actualized at all. If it is actual, 
     {tm}Ae(tn)  {tm}□Ae(tn) 
holds as well. If it is not actualized at all, it holds only 
     {tm}Ae(tn)  {tm}◊Ae(tn) 
but not 
     {tm}Ae(tn)  {tm}□Ae(tn), 
since in this case  
     {tm}◊Ae(tn) 
also holds. 
     In the case that the world at tn is only partly actualized, that is, actualized only on 
some tk, tk  tn, the modality of Ae(tn) at tm depends on how the world is actualized at tk. If 
the actualization at tk is such that Ae(tk) would be true at tk if Ae(tn) were true at tn, then, 
since Ae(tk) should be true if Ae(tn) were true according to Prior’s Axiom introduced 
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above,  Ae(tn) is possible at tm, i.e., {tm}◊Ae(tn), while, if the actualization is such that 
Ae(tk) is true at tk, Ae(tn) is impossible at tm, i.e., {tm}◊Ae(tn), and so {tm}□Ae(tn). 
     The same holds if tm  tn. Namely, if tk is the overlapping interval of tm and tn, 
{tm}◊Ae(tn) holds if and only if Ae(tk) is false already at tk. This overlapping case is 
especially interesting because it shows that, in spite of the fact that the world at tk is 
actualized, Ae(tk) may be only possible and yet not necessary at tk! But this is so only 
because, according to Prior’s Axiom, the truth of Ae(tk) depends also on what will happen 
after tk. So, for instance, if it is actually snowing in the morning, this doesn’t mean that it 
will be snowing the whole day. The proposition about the whole day snowing is only 
possibly true in the morning. But if it is not snowing in the morning, the same proposition 
is necessarily false already in the morning. 
     As we see, all modalities concerning propositions that are not logical truths are 
conditional modalities, even if we define the anti-domain of R in the broadest possible 
way, as I did it. So, as in the case of three-valued logic, the Sea Battle case is just one 
particular case to which the “new logic” is applicable. It is easy to see that if Ae(tn) is the 
proposition stating that the sea battle e happens at tn and if tn is a time interval at which 
no world is yet actualized at all, both {tm}◊Ae(tn) and {tm}◊Ae(tn) are true at a world 
that is actual at some time tm that is earlier than tn. But this is so neither because, at tm, 
Ae(tn) and Ae(tn) don’t have truth-values, as it should be according to Aristotle, nor 
because, at tm, their truth-value is indeterminate, as it should be according to 
Lukasiewicz, but because {tm}Ae(tn), {tm}{tn}Ae(tn), {tm}{tn}Ae(tn), {tm}◊Ae(tn) 
and {tm}◊Ae(tn) are all consistently true. 
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     Let me summarize the point of the offered solution to the Sea Battle Puzzle by citing 
the six consistent propositions whose truth depends on whether, for tm≺tn, it is only tm on 
which a world is actualized or it is also tn. In addition to putting them formally, I shall 
also express them in idiomatic English tense language (where e will denote the sea battle 
and tm and tn today and tomorrow respectively) and also, since the puzzle was originally 
introduced in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, in Ancient Greek.39 
1. If there is a world actualized on tm but not on tn, then ⊨tmAe(tn), i.e., It is true 
today that the tomorrow’s sea battle has not happened; Σήμερον ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν 
ὅτι ἡ αὔριον ναυμαχία οὐκ ἐγένετο. 
2. If there are worlds actualized both on tm and on tn, then, if ⊨tnAe(tn), then 
⊨tntmAe(tn), i.e., If the sea battle really happens tomorrow, it will be true 
tomorrow that it was true the day before that the sea battle would happen the day 
after; Ἐὰν γένηται αὔριον ἡ ναυμαχία, ἔσται αὔριον ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι 
ἦν τῇ προτεραίᾳ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἔσεσθαι τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ τὴν ναυμαχίαν. 
3. If there is a world actualized on tm but not on tn, then ⊨tmtn Ae (tn), i.e., It is 
not true today that it will be true tomorrow that the sea battle has happened that 
day (independently of whether it happens tomorrow or not); Σήμερον οὐκ 
ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἔσεσθαι αὔριον ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐγένετο ἡ ναυμαχία 
ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ. 
4. If there is a world actualized on tm but not on tn, then ⊨tmtn Ae (tn), i.e., It 
is not true today that it will be true tomorrow that the sea battle has not happened 
that day (independently of whether it happens tomorrow or not); Σήμερον οὐκ 
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ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἔσεσθαι αὔριον ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἐγένετο ἡ 
ναυμαχία ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ. 
5. If there are worlds actualized both on tm and on tn, then, if ⊨tnAe(tn), then 
⊨tntmtnAe(tn), i.e., If the sea battle really happens tomorrow, it will be true 
tomorrow that it was true the day before that it would be true the day after that the 
sea battle had happened that day; Ἐὰν γένηται αὔριον ἡ ναυμαχία, ἔσται 
αὔριον ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἦν τῇ προτεραίᾳ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἔσεσθαι τῇ 
ὑστεραίᾳ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐγένετο ἡ ναυμαχία ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ. 
6. If there are worlds actualized both on tm and on tn, then, if ⊨tnAe(tn), then 
⊨tntmtnAe(tn), i.e., If the sea battle does not happen tomorrow, it will be 
true tomorrow that it was true the day before that it would be true the day after 
that the sea battle had not happened that day; Ἐὰν μὴ γένηται αὔριον ἡ 
ναυμαχία, ἔσται αὔριον ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἦν τῇ προτεραίᾳ ἀληθὲς 
εἰπεῖν ἔσεσθαι τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἐγένετο ἡ ναυμαχία 
ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ. 
The possible advantage of this solution to the Sea Battle problem can be assessed only 
indirectly, since it is clear that all the three solutions are essentially similar. I suggested 
above that a possible advantage of Lukasiewicz’s solution over that of Aristotle’s may 
be: (1) that it is based on an independently sketched system of logic, while Aristotle’s 
solution might seem ad hoc; and (2) that it does not violate the principle according to 
which the complex proposition has a truth-value only if the component propositions have 
truth values as well. A possible advantage of the third solution over that of Lukasiewicz’s 
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might be said to consist in the fact that indeterminateness does not look as a good 
candidate for being a truth-value. However, it could still be said that the solution within 
temporal-modal logic represents just a further analytical refinement of what Lukasiewicz 
had in mind when he suggested possibility as that to which the third truth-value refers. 
Namely, even if we are reluctant to accept that possibility as such, whatever it may be 
otherwise, is a truth-value, we may agree that truth and falsehood are not directly 
applicable to those propositions which are only to become true or false. That’s why 
modal logic, naturally combined with temporal logic, seems to be the best choice that can 
do the job, as the system outlined above may show. 
 
V. Concluding considerations: Time as a line-in-drawing 
 
One might say that, curiously enough, the third solution is conservative when compared 
with the solutions of Aristotle’s and Lukasiewicz’s, since, though it uses the tools of 
modern modal and temporal logics, it neither assumes the existence of truth-value gaps 
nor rejects the Principle of Bivalence. It is conservative in another respect as well, 
namely, by being compatible only with the tensed and not with the so-called new theory 
of time, which is tenseless.
40
 
     The contemporary tenseless theory of time has nothing to do with Boethius’ 
eternalism or with McTaggart’s theory of the unreality of time.41 The contemporary 
detensers accept the reality of time insofar as they accept the reality of the earlier than 
relation that, in addition to the simultaneity relation, can hold between two events. If the 
structure of time were represented within a period-based system, as it is done in the 
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Appendix, detensers would certainly also accept the reality of the abutment, the 
overlapping and the inclusion relation. What detensers deny is the reality of tenses, i.e., 
the reality of pastness, presentness and futurity (or any other tenses whatsoever). As 
Einstein once put it: “For us faithful physicists, the separation between past, present and 
future has only the meaning of an illusion, although a persisting one.”42 
     Now, it may be unclear prima facie why my solution requires the reality of tenses, 
since it is given without introducing the properties of pastness, presentness and futurity,
43
 
without introducing tense operators (e.g. as Prior does
44
) and without using temporal 
indexicals.
45
 Remarkably, it is formulated in a tenseless language! 
     The reason why the tenses still occur after all follows only from the way in which 
different modalities are defined and not from the fact that we always look at the world 
from the present perspective.
46
 The reality of tenses has nothing to do with the existence 
of an observer. So, the difference between pastness and futurity, as I am now going to 
show, may be defined via what is true about modalities that are inherent to the real world 
as such.
47
 This will turn out to be so because all modalities concerning propositions that 
are not logical truths are conditional, depending solely on the relations between the times 
at which the propositions should supposedly hold and the times they speak about, which 
becomes most clearly visible if the anti-domain of the accessibility relation is defined in 
the broadest possible way, just as I defined it above. 
     Let us suppose that 
     (tn)(tm tn  {tm}(◊AE(tn)  ◊AE(tn))) 
is true independently of which particular event (e, e’, e’’,…) is substituted for E 
(remember that is the abutment relation, which is definable via  relation – see 
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Appendix). In this case, we can say that tm is one of the present intervals, while any time 
interval that is later than tm belongs to the future.
48
 The reason that tm is just one of the 
present intervals follows from the fact that we have implicitly, by introducing the axioms 
cited in the Appendix, defined time as a non-quantized one-dimensional continuum, so 
that tm can be a second, a minute, an hour, a day, a year, and so on, ad libitum. But 
whatever it is, it is present because any interval that abuts it lies in the future. 
     It should be noted that if we want to speak about absolute presentness, we can easily 
have it. We should only define instant as the abutment place of two equivalence classes 
of abutting intervals. The present instant will be then the abutment place of the 
equivalence class of present intervals and the equivalence class of intervals that abut 
them. So, after all, the absolute presentness will be the abutment place of some tm and the 
intervals abutting it such that 
     (tn)(tmtn  {tm}(◊AE(tn)  ◊AE(tn))) 
is true.
49
 
     Let us suppose now that 
     (tn)(tmtn  {tm}(□Ae(tn)  □AE(tn))) 
is true independently of which particular event (e, e’, e’’,…) is substituted for E. In this 
case, tm lies in the past, since a proposition about an event that happens at some time later 
than tm can be necessary only if the world at that later time is already actualized. 
     And finally, let us suppose that 
     (tn)( tm tn  {tm}(◊AE(tn)  ◊AE(tn))) 
is false independently of which particular event (e, e’, e’’,…) is substituted for E. Since 
this cannot be because at the world that is actual at tm neither ◊AE(tn) nor ◊AE(tn) is 
 35 
true, it can be so only because there is no actual world at tm at which they would be 
assertable. And this means, consequently, that tm lies in the future. 
     In relation to the last fact, it is a good place to notice that the accessibility relation is 
unconditionally reflexive, but only conditionally symmetric and transitive. It is symmetric 
if and only if the worlds between it would be stated to hold were already actualized, and 
it is transitive if and only if all the three worlds between it would be stated to hold were 
already actualized. 
     Not accidentally has it turned out that, although formulated in a tenseless language, 
the solution to the Sea Battle problem within temporal modal logic implies the reality of 
tenses. The flow of time assumption is also implicitly present in the solutions of 
Aristotle’s and Lukasiewicz’s, since the rejection of the tenseless view is equivalent with 
the rejection of the principle that, as Lukasiewicz put it, “if A is b at instant t, then it is 
true at every instant earlier than t that A is b at instant t”, where A stands for a contingent 
proposition and b for one of the only two truth-values.
50
 
     As a general lesson, we may conclude that though time can be represented as an 
endless one-dimensional continuous line, this line should be conceived not as a drawn 
line but as a line-in-drawing. This is the only way to avoid logical determinism or, 
actually, any sort of complete determinism. The contemporary tenseless theory of time 
implies complete determinism, whereas, if there are indeterministic events, the tensed 
theory of time is true. Thus if there is libertarian free will or an indeterminism implied by 
quantum mechanics, the tensed theory of time is true. In spite of “the pronouncements of 
the Saints, who say that God does not know things that are going to be in a way different 
from that in which [He knows] things that are”51, the Ockhamists cannot stick to these 
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pronouncements and claim, at the same time, that whether a person will be saved or not 
depends on his or her free will. 
Appendix 
The interval-based structure of time axiomatized in the infinitary language L11 
 
Let, in the intended model of the interval-based system of time SI, the individual variables 
t1, t2,…, ti,…, t’, t’’, t’’’,… range over one-dimensional time stretches, and let the relation 
symbols =, , , , ,  and  be interpreted as the identity, precedence, succession, 
abutment, overlapping and inclusion relations respectively. Let the elementary formulae 
be tm  tn, tm   tn,  tm  tn, tm  tn, tm  tn, tm  tn and am  an, as well as any formula 
obtainable by substituting other variables and/or individual constants t1, t2,…, ti,… for tm 
and/or tn, where 
 
tm  tn def. tn  tm  and  tm  tn def. tn  tm,  
tm  tn def. tm  tn  (tl)(tm  tl  tl  tn),   
tm  tn def. (tl)(tk)(tl  tn tl  tm  tm  tk   tn  tk), 
tm tn def. tm  tn  (tl)(tl  tm  tl  tn). 
 
The Axiom Schemes of SI 
 
1.   (tn)tn  tn 
2.   (tk)(tl)(tm)(tn)(tk  tm  tl  tn  tk  tn  tl  tm) 
3.   (tm)(tn)(tm  tn  tm tn  (tl)(tm tl tl  tn)) 
4.   (tk)(tl)(tm)(tn)(tk tm  tk tn  tl tm  tl tn) 
5.   (tk)(tl)(tm)(tn)(tk tl  tl tn  tk tm   tm tn  tl  tm) 
6.   (tm)(tn)tm
  tn 
7.   (tm)(tn)tn
  tm 
8.   (tm)(tn) tn  tm 
9.   (t1)(t2)…(ti)…((t’)(1i< 
 
ti
  t’)  
       (t’’) (1i<
 
ti
  t’’  (t’’’)(1i< ti   t’’’  t’’’  t’’))) 
10. (t1)(t2)…(ti)…((t’)(1i< 
 
ti   t’)   
       (t’’)(1i< ti
 
  t’’  (t’’’)(1i< ti   t’’’  t’’’  t’’))) 
                                                 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1
  Lukasiewicz 1922, p. 126. 
2
  Lukasiewicz 1918, p. 86. 
3
  Lukasiewicz 1920, p. 87. 
4
  Brouwer 1908, pp. 109ff.  
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5
  For the condensed but clear survey of the main differences between modern interpretations see Craig 
   1988, Ch. I, and pp. 2ff. and 281-283 in particular; see also Gasking 1995.  
6
  See Anscombe 1956, Strang 1960, Rescher 1968, Hintikka 1964 and 1973. 
7
  Aristoteles 1831, 19a18ff. (Ackrill’s translation; cf. Aristotle 2002). 
8
  In this place, the translation differs from that of Ackrill for the reason given below. 
9
  Aristoteles 1831, 19a23.      
10
 Ibid. 19a35-38. 
11
 Cf. Ross 1953, Kneale 1967, Ackrill 2002, Frede 1970. 
12
 For me, this is quite obvious; cf. also Craig 1988, pp. 10ff. 
13
 See, for instance, Strang 1960, pp. 460ff. 
14
 Cf. Craig 1988, p. 2. 
15
 Boethius 1984, V, 6. 
16
 Ockham 1945, Q. I, Supp. VI. 
17
 Loc. cit. 
18
 Loc. cit. 
19
 Loc. cit. 
20
 Ibid. Q. I, Dub. V. 
21
 Ibid. Q. I, Supp. III. 
22
 Ibid. Q. I, Supp. IV. 
23
 Lukasiewics 1922, p. 126. 
24
 Loc. cit. 
25
 Cf. Lukasiewicz 1920, p. 87. 
26
 Ibid., p. 88. 
27
 Lukasiewicz 1922, p. 127. 
28
 Lukasiewicz 1918, p. 86 and Lukasiewicz 1922, p. 126. 
29
 Lewis 1973 and 1986. 
30
 Cf. Arsenijević 2002, pp. 134ff. and Arsenijević 2003b, pp. 342ff. 
31
 Cf. Arsenijević and Kapetanović 2008a, pp. 82ff., and Arsenijević and Kapetanović 2008b, pp. 42ff. 
32
 In this paper, I am going, for the first time, to use this generalization. 
33
 Cf. Arseniojević 2002, pp. 126ff. 
34
 Cf. Chellas 1980, pp. 67ff. 
35
 Loc. cit. 
36
 Cf. Deutsch 1990, and as directly relevant for my purposes, the quotation from Belnap in note 46 below. 
37
 For Le Poidevin, “the future cannot be ontologically” but only “epistemologically  indeterminate” (Le 
   Poidevin 1991, p. 130). 
38
 Arsenijević 2003b, p. 345. 
39
 Thanks to Vojin Nedeljković. 
40
 Cf. Oaklander and Smith 1994 and Mellor 1998. 
41
 Cf. Section II above and McTaggart 1908. 
42
 Einstein 1949, p. 537. 
43
 This is how tenses are defined in the tense system of events that I outlined in Arsenijević 2003, pp. 328ff.  
44
 Prior 1967. 
45
 Ludlow 1999, pp. 124ff. 
46
 Cf. Belnap, Perloff, and Xu 2001 and Belnap 2007. 
47
 “If a certain possibility is real, then if it has any relevance at all for us, it must be part and parcel of Our 
   World. Conclusion: The brilliantly conceived doctrine of Lewis 1986 (and elsewhere) ought to be 
   rejected” (Belnap 2007, p. 87, note 1). 
48
 This is how the difference between the pastness and the futurity is to be defined in the period-based 
   system of time as it is axiomatized in the Appendix.   
49
 This is how the difference between the pastness and the futurity is to be defined in the instant-based 
   system of time that is presupposed in Jokić 2003. However, the period-based and the instant- 
   based systems are both syntactically and semantically only trivially different amongst themselves (cf. 
   Arsenijević 2003a, and Arsenijević and Kapetanović 2008a). 
50
 Lukasiewicz 1922, p. 127. 
51
 Ockham 1945, Q. I, Supp. VI. 
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